

TEST BANK



TERENCE BALL · RICHARD DAGGER

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES
AND THE
DEMOCRATIC IDEAL

SEVENTH EDITION



INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL AND TEST BANK
FOR

BALL | DAGGER

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL

SEVENTH EDITION

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TERENCE BALL


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Instructor's Manual and Test Bank to accompany Ball/Dagger, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*, Seventh Edition

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PREFACE

This Instructor's Manual and Test Bank is designed to assist instructors—especially harried, busy, overworked ones—in summarizing and presenting materials drawn from our text, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*, Seventh Edition, and in examining students on those materials. Different instructors will, no doubt, wish to use these guidelines in different ways and with their own additions and innovations.

We welcome any suggestions you might have for clarifying, expanding or otherwise improving upon these guidelines. Terence Ball can be reached via email at tball@asu.edu; Richard Dagger can be contacted at rdagger@asu.edu.

Being a bit busy, harried and overworked ourselves, we are most grateful for the help and hard work of our graduate assistant, Justin Tosi, in putting together this edition of the Instructor's Manual and Test Bank.

Terence Ball

Richard Dagger

1. Introduction: What is Ideology and Why Study It?

READING ASSIGNMENT

Ball and Dagger, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal* (Text), Chapter 1.

Optional: Ball and Dagger (editors), *Ideals and Ideologies: A Reader* (Reader), Part I.

LESSON OBJECTIVES

After finishing this lesson, the student should be able to:

1. Describe what the term *ideology* originally meant.
2. Define the term *ideology*, as it will be used in this course.
3. Identify the four functions of a *political ideology*.
4. Specify the connection between *ideology* and *human nature*.
5. Discern the link between different ideologies and their respective understandings of *freedom*.
6. Understand the connection between *ideology* and *revolutionary political changes*.

NOTES

Ours has been called “the age of ideology.” It might more accurately be termed the age of ideologies — plural, not singular—because we live in a world of contrasting and competing ideologies. The high degree of ideological conflict, combined with the ever-increasing sophistication and destructive potential of technology, makes a potent and potentially explosive combination. This combination helps to explain the ferocity of political conflicts—wars, civil wars, wars of national liberation, and revolutions—in the twentieth century. If we are to understand this world and to survive in it, we need to appreciate not only the awesome power of technology but also the power of political ideas and ideologies.

As the word *ideology* implies, the term originally referred to the systematic study of the origins or sources of our ideas. This eighteenth-century notion of ideology did not survive into the nineteenth century. An ideology came to mean a set of ideas that was somehow suspect, and quite probably false. The term *ideology* still retains this meaning for many of us. As we will use the term in this course, however, *ideology* has no pejorative or unfavorable connotations.

By *ideology* we refer to a systematically interrelated set of ideas that fulfills four functions: explanatory, evaluative, orientative, and programmatic. An ideology, that is, (1) purports to *explain* political phenomena; (2) offers a basis for *evaluating* actions, practices, and policies; (3) *orients* its adherents to the sociopolitical world, giving them a sense of identity and purpose; and (4) provides a *program* of political action.

Virtually everyone has a political ideology of some sort; otherwise he or she would remain relatively disoriented, would be unable to account for puzzling political and social phenomena, lack a basis for moral and political evaluation, and be unsure of what he or she should be doing, and with (or to) whom he or she should be doing it.

Different ideologies, of course, fulfill the four functions in quite different ways. Each supplies its adherents with quite different explanations, standards of evaluation, social orientations, and programs of political action.

In addition to these four functions, modern ideologies have two further features. First, every ideology has at its core a view of human nature—a conception of what human beings are, what moves or motivates them, what they are capable of achieving, and how they are (or ought to be) related to others. Second, and perhaps more surprising, every ideology harbors a particular view of freedom (or liberty). *Freedom*, for a fascist, means something quite different than it does for a feminist, a liberal, or a Marxist. But how can this be?

The answer is that *freedom*, like *democracy* (see Lesson 2), is an *essentially contested* concept—that is, a concept whose meaning is forever in dispute. Just as we do not all agree on what counts as *art* (do Andy Warhol’s paintings of Campbell’s soup cans count?) or *music* (are John Cage’s strident atonal compositions music or noise?) or *dance* (does the “slam dancing” of punk rockers count as dancing?), so do we disagree about definitions of *democracy* and *freedom*.

We will discuss the disputes that rage around democracy in the following lesson. Here we want to look more closely at liberty and freedom. We can understand the different ways in which different ideologies construct the concept of freedom by looking at the three features of any view of freedom.

Freedom is a three-sided or *triadic* relation. It involves: (1) an *agent*—someone who is said to be free (or unfree, as the case may be); (2) a *goal*—something at which the agent aims or hopes to achieve; and (3) an *obstacle* (or *obstacles*)—the actual or potential barriers that stand in an agent’s way. To say that, “A is free” therefore means that an agent (A) is free from an obstacle or barrier (B) and is therefore free to achieve his or her aims or goals (C).

Ideologies differ in the ways in which they identify the agent, the obstacle(s), and the aim(s) or goal(s) sought by the agent. For example, a liberal—as we will see in Chapter 3—identifies the agent as an individual; the obstacle as other individuals with whom he or she is in economic or other competition; and the goal as success in his or her competitive endeavor.

By contrast, a Marxist, as we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6, conceives of the agent not as an individual but as a class—the working class—and the obstacle as another class, the capitalists and the economic system over which they preside (namely, capitalism); and Marxists view the aim as the emancipation of workers in a cooperative, classless communist society.

And a Nazi, as we will see in Chapter 7, views the agent as a racial or ethnic group (a *Volk*); the aim as racial purity; and the obstacle(s) as the presence, the influence, and even the ideas of Jews and other supposedly “inferior” races or ethnic groups.

Other ideologies, of course, conceive of freedom in still other ways. For the moment, all students need to remember is that freedom is an essentially contested concept to which different ideologies give different meanings. As the next lesson explains, the same is true of democracy.

Before we consider the different ways in which competing ideologies construct the concept of democracy, we need to take note of a further feature of ideologies in the modern world. Despite their differences and their mutual antagonisms, modern ideologies are alike in being *revolutionary*. Each seeks to remake the world in its own image. Each tries to turn the world upside down. And this is because each views the political world in a different way. Each ideology offers its own explanation and evaluation of otherwise puzzling political and economic events. Each orients its adherents in a distinctive way. And each offers its own political program, its own vision of the good society.

Ideologies are predicated on the notion that ideas are important, that they do, or can, make a big political difference. People die, often quite willingly, in wars and revolutions, not merely because they expect to enjoy some material or economic advantage—far from it—but because they believe strongly and fervently in the transforming power of ideas.

Political ideas and ideals have had, and continue to have, a profound impact in reshaping the political landscape in which we live. It therefore behooves us, not only as students and scholars, but also as citizens, to understand the nature of the ideologies that have made a deep and lasting impression upon our world.

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT

If you ask students to keep a journal, you might begin by asking them to react to and reflect briefly upon the first chapter and (if you are also using the Ball and Dagger Reader) the accompanying essay by Terrell Carver on the history of *ideology*.

2. *The Democratic Ideal*

READING ASSIGNMENT

Text, Chapter 2

Optional: Reader, Part II

LESSON OBJECTIVES

After completing this lesson, students should be able to:

1. Recognize the difference between democracy as an *ideal*, “the democratic ideal”, and the different conceptions of democracy held by competing ideologies.
2. Describe what *democracy* originally meant.
3. Recognize the main features of the *republican* tradition as it evolved from Aristotle and Polybius to the American founding.
4. Outline the rise, decline, and revival of the democratic ideal from ancient Greece to the present.
5. Describe the ways in which the meaning of *democracy* has changed over the course of Western history.
6. Identify the reasons for which non-Western, non-liberal regimes—such as the “people’s democracies” of China and the Soviet Union—have claimed to be democratic.
7. Know what is meant by the claim that *democracy* is an essentially contested concept.

NOTES

Our word *democracy* comes from two Greek words: *demos* meaning, “people,” or “common people,” and *kratein*, “to rule.” Thus, *demokratia* originally meant, “rule by, and in the interest of, the common people.” And since the common people constituted a numerical majority, democracy came to be associated with the idea of *majority rule*. Early Greek democracy was thus a system of class rule, that is, of rule by one class, the *demos*, in its own interest and, as often as not, in opposition to the interests of other classes, including the *aristoi* (“the best”—the source of our word *aristocracy*, “rule by those few who are best qualified to govern”).

Democracy in the Golden Age of Greece—the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E.—seems by our modern standards to have been “undemocratic” in several respects. For one thing, the right to vote and hold public office was denied to women, resident aliens (*metics*), and slaves. For another, there were no legally guaranteed rights of freedom of speech, press, and assembly. Any citizen who publicly expressed unpopular views could, by a majority vote in the Athenian Assembly, be banished from the city and forced into exile, or even executed. Such was the fate of Socrates, the philosophical gadfly executed in 399 B.C.E. for daring to question certain popularly held religious and political views—including views about the value of democracy. Questions about truth, he claimed, cannot be decided by majority vote.

Socrates’ pupil Plato agreed. His best-known work, *The Republic*, criticizes democracy and paints a memorable picture of an ideal state ruled by a wise “philosopher-king.” Plato’s pupil Aristotle took a somewhat more favorable view of democracy, although he too believed it to be a factious, unstable, and short-lived system of government. The best system, he argued, would be a system of “rule by the many,” or *polity*, which aims at promoting the public good, not the individual or class interests of one faction or another. This idea of a *mixed constitution* or *republic* (from the Latin *res publica*, meaning “the public thing” or “the public business”) was picked up and developed by later Greek and Roman thinkers, including Polybius. He attributed the longevity of the Roman Republic to its mixture of different classes and interests; out of their competition and compromises came a closer approximation to the public good.

Two important events stifled the further development of the idea that the best system of government was one in which the people ruled. The first was the demise of the Roman Republic. With the triumph of the tyrannical Caesars, Rome ceased to be a popularly governed republic, becoming instead a despotical and

militarily expansionist empire. The second was the rise of Christianity, with its contention that worldly matters—including political matters—are much less important than otherworldly ones, especially salvation.

Democratic and republican ideals went into a long eclipse that ceased only during the Italian Renaissance (or *rebirth*—the rebirth of classical learning and political ideas and ideals). The Renaissance writer who did more than anyone else to revive and defend the idea of *republican* government was Niccolò Machiavelli. In his *Discourses* (1531) he criticizes princely rule, advocating instead a system of popular rule by a virtuous and vigilant citizenry bent on protecting their liberty, which Machiavelli equates with the idea of self-government. The greatest danger to republican or self-government comes from *corruption*—the tendency to turn away from attending to the public business and turn inward toward private or individual interest, especially economic self-interest. Liberty or self-government, Machiavelli insisted, was not for the lazy, the selfish or corrupt, but was fit only for citizens steeped in self-discipline, love of country, civic virtue, and respect for the law. Only under “a government of laws, not men,” could citizens remain free.

These ideas proved to be particularly influential in seventeenth-century England. As developed by James Harrington and others, the idea that popular self-government could be both stable and just became central to “the Atlantic republican tradition” which was later to inspire the American revolutionaries and Founding Fathers.

But seventeenth-century England also saw the return of *democracy*, at least as an inspirational ideal. During the English Civil War of the 1640s, some thinkers—Levellers like John Lilburne and Diggers, such as Gerrard Winstanley—called for the creation of *democracy*, that is, rule by and for the benefit of the common people. At about the same time, in the new English colony of America, dissident puritans like Roger Williams were preaching that all people being equal in God’s eyes entailed their being equally entitled to govern themselves in a “democratically” way.

Still, democracy remained a dissident—and, to some, a dangerous—form of government, usually equated with mob rule. Only in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did democracy finally become respectable. In the United States, the democratic ideal was altered by the republican tradition, with its emphasis on balanced government, the rule of law, and the protection of civil rights.

Yet there are other regimes and systems of government that claim to be *democratic* but which do not offer such safeguards for individual rights. The so-called (and now defunct) people’s democracies of Eastern Europe, for example, censored the press and sometimes imprisoned outspoken critics for expressing their views. And yet they claimed to be democratic—indeed, to be more genuinely democratic than the United States. Surely, one might think, this cannot be so. In order to see how this might be, we need to remember the earlier meaning of *democracy*. In its original Greek sense, democracy meant rule by and for the benefit of the numerically largest social class. In modern industrial society this class is the working class or, to use Marx’s term, the *proletariat*. Because the proletarian or people’s democracies rule in the interest of the working class, this, they claim, entitles them to be called *democracies*. This assertion continues to be heard from the communist regimes of China, North Korea, Viet Nam and Cuba.

Thus, in the modern world, the word *democracy* is an essentially contested concept—that is, a term with a meaning in dispute. Different people, adhering to different ideologies, define *democracy* in quite different ways. For some, the concept is closely connected with a particular social class; for others it is not. For some, democracy means not only majority rule but, in addition, the protection of minority rights; for others, it means nothing of the sort.

And this, in turn, gives rise to a concluding consideration: democracy is not itself an ideology but an *ideal*—an aim or aspiration—that different ideologies define in different and sometimes radically divergent ways.

Just what those ideologies are, and how they define democracy and allied notions such as *liberty* (or *freedom*), will be discussed in later chapters.

WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT

You might wish to ask students to react briefly in their journals to what they read in the text (and, if you use it, the reader) for this lesson. How, if at all, do these readings alter or enlarge their previous understanding of democracy?